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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
Estate of Kenneth Carl Larson, Respondent, represented by 
the Personal Representative Vicky Larson Carroll 
Attorneys for the Respondent: Ronald W, Thompson and 
Michael I). Hughes of the law firm Thompson, Hughes 
& Reber 
Southern Nevada Memorial Hospital, Appellant 
Attorneys for the Appellant: LaMar J. Winward of the law 
firm Snow & Nuffer 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
What is the appropriate standard of review when parties 
submit a case for ruling to the District Court on 
stipulated facts? 
Is the Hospital's Notice of Claim filed in Nevada prior 
to the appointment of a personal representative valid 
for any purpose? 
Is the Hospital's Notice of Claim filed in Nevada prior 
to the publication of Notice to Creditors valid for 
any purpose? 
Was there an "Adjudication11 in the State of Nevada 
allowing the Hospital's claim which can serve as a 
contemplated basis for the operation of Utah Code 
Annotated Section 75-4-401? 
Is there sufficient evidence of fraud which would 
justify the operation of Utah Code Annotated 75-1-106? 
Should this Court judicially create an equitable 
exception to the nonclaim provisions of the Uniform 
Probate Code in the instant case? 
Does Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-38 operate to 
the exclusion of Section 75-3-803 in cases where a 
cause of action exists in this state, but the decedent 
dies out of Utah? 
1 
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STATUTES AND RULES 
§75-1-105 CONSTRUCTION AGAINST IMPLIED REPEAL. 
This code is a general act intended as a unified coverage 
of its subject matter, and no part of it shall be deemed 
impliedly repealed by subsequent legislation if it can 
reasonably be avoided. 
§75-1-106. EFFECT OF FRAUD AND EVASION. 
Whenever fraud has been perpetrated in connection with 
any proceeding or in any statement filed under this 
code or if fraud is used to avoid or circumvent the 
provisions or purposes of this code, any person injured 
thereby may obtain appropriate relief against the perpe-
trator of the fraud or restitution from any person (other 
than a bona fide purchaser) benefitting from the fraud, 
whether innocent or not. Any proceeding must be commenced 
within three years after the discovery of the fraud, but 
no proceeding may be brought against one not a perpe-
trator of the fraud later than five years after the 
time of commission of the fraud. This section has no 
bearing on remedies relating to fraud practiced on a 
decedent during his lifetime which affects the succession 
of his estate. 
§75-3-104. CLAIMS AGAINST DECEDENT - NECESSITY OF 
ADMINISTRATION. 
No proceeding to enforce a claim against the estate of a 
decedent or his successors may be revived or commenced 
before the appointment of a personal representative. 
After the appointment and until distribution, all pro-
ceedings and actions to enforce a claim against the 
estate are governed by the procedure prescribed by this 
chapter 3. After distribution a creditor whose claim 
has not been barred may recover from the distributees as 
provided in Section 75-3-1004 or from a former personal 
representative individually liable as provided in Section 
75-3-1005. This section has no application to a proceeding 
by a secured creditor of the decedent to enforce his right 
to his security except as to any deficiency judgment which 
might be sought therein. 
§75-3-803. LIMITATIONS OF PRESENTATIONS OF CLAIMS. 
(1) All claims against a decedent1s estate which arose 
before the death of the decedent, including claims of 
the state and any subdivision of it, whether due or to 
become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or un-
7 
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liquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal 
basis, if not barred earlier by other statute of limi-
tations, are barred against the estate, the personal 
representative, and the heirs and devisees of the 
decedent, unless presented as follows: 
(a) Within three months after the date of the first 
publication of notice to creditors if notice is given 
in compliance with Section 75-3-801; provided claims 
barred by the nonclaim statute at the decedent's 
domicile before the first publication for claims in 
the state are also barred in this state. 
(b) Within three years after the decedent's death, 
if notice to creditors has not been published. 
(2) All claims against a decedent's estate which arise 
at or after the death of the decedent, including claims 
of the state and any subdivision of it, whether due or 
to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or un-
liquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal 
basis, are barred against the estate, the personal rep-
resentative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent 
unless presented as follows: 
(a) A claim based on a contract with the personal 
representative, within three months after performance 
by the personal representative is due; 
(b) Any other claim, within three months after it 
arises. 
(3) Nothing in this section affects or prevents: 
(a) Any proceeding to enforce any mortgage, pledge, 
or other lien upon property of the estate; or 
(b) To the limits of the insurance protection only, 
any proceeding to establish liability of the decedent 
or the personal representative for which he is pro-
tected by liability insurance. 
75-4-401. EFFECT OF ADJUDICATION FOR OR AGAINST 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE. 
An adjudication rendered in any jurisdiction in favor 
of or against any personal representative of the estate 
is binding on the local personal representative as if 
he were a party to the adjudication. 
78-12-38. OUTSIDE THIS STATE. 
If a person against whom a cause of action exists dies 
without the state, the time which elapses between his 
death and the expiration of one year after the issuing, 
within the state, of letters testamentary or letters of 
administration is not a part of the time limited for the 
commencement of an action therefor against his executor 
or administrator. 
a 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Fifth Judicial District 
Court's denial of Appellant's Petition for Allowance of Claim 
in a Probate proceeding/ Appellant's Petition for Allowance 
of Claim was filed after Vickie Carroll, the personal represen-
tative of the Estate hereinafter Personal Representative, 
denied the claim. The District Court ruled that the claim 
was barred by the operation of the nonclaim provisions of 
§ 75-3-803 of the Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the hearing on the Appellant's Petition for 
Allowance of Claim on September 10, 1984, the parties agreed 
and stipulated to submit Appellant's Petition to the District 
Court for ruling soley on the stipulated and undisputed facts 
which are found in the Findings of Fact. (R 108; 110-112.) 
The decedent died at the Hospital in Las Vegas 
Nevada on December 21, 1982. Upon the decedent's admission 
to the Hospital on December 6, 1982, he listed his address 
as 4001 East Sahara Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada, which is the 
address of Maycliff Mini Storage and RV Park, the location 
of property stored by the decedent. (R 110.) On January 4, 
1983, Mr. Jared Shafer was appointed Special Administrator 
of the decedent's estate in Nevada by order of the Eighth 
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Judicial District Court, Clark County Nevada. Appellant 
filed a creditor's claim in the amount of $24,832.54 with 
the Nevada Court on January 6, 1983, which was prior to the 
appointment of any personal representative or general adminis-
trator in the Nevada administration. (R 111.) Before the 
filing of the Creditor's Claim, on January 5, 1983, Vickie 
Larson Carroll, the decedent's daughter, nominated Mr. 
Shafer to be the general administrator of her father's 
estate in Nevada. No general administrator was appointed, 
however, until February 18, 1983. (R 67-68.) In the 
meantime another administration of the estate was open in 
the State of Montana. (R 111.) 
The Utah probate was timely commenced on January 26, 
1983, when Vickie Larsen Carroll petitioned and was appointed 
personal representative of the estate. (R 111.) Publication 
of Notice to Creditors in Utah occured in January and February 
of 1983. (R 111.) 
Appellant filed its Creditor's Claim in Utah on 
November 14, 1983. (R 111.) The Personal Representative 
denied the claim and Appellant filed its Petition for 
Allowance of Claim on June 8, 1984. (R 111.) The District 
Court dismissed Appellant's petition on the motion of the 
Personal Representative after a hearing in which all counsel 
submitted the matter based solely upon a series of stipulated 
and undisputed facts. (R 110-112.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Hospital's Petition for Allowance of Claim 
was submitted to the District Court for ruling on the basis 
of stipulated facts. As such it is an agreed case, and the 
denial of the petition by the trial court is not properly 
designated as a "dismissal" implying a truncated evidentiary 
process which would now require reviewing the facts in a 
light most favorable to Appellant. Since the stipulation of 
the parties substitutes for trial, this Court should defer 
the factual findings of the trial court and confine its view 
of the evidence to those findings. Indeed, Appellant tactically 
agreed that the matter be submitted on this basis. 
2. Utah Code Annotated 75-3-104 prohibits filing 
claims against the decedent before the appointment of a 
personal representative. This Court should support the 
expressed policies and intentions of the framers of the 
Uniform Probate Code and encourage orderly and uniform 
estate administration by requiring, consistent with §75-3-104, 
that creditors submit their claims to properly appointed 
personal representatives. This Court should hold, with other 
authorities, that a claim filed prior to the appointment of 
a personal representative is void. 
3. For similar policy reasons as those expressed 
the above paragraph 2, this Court should hold that creditor's 
claims filed prior to publication of Notice to Cretitors are 
void. 
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4-. The Trial Court found no evidence of fraud which 
would trigger the operation of § 75-1-106 Utah Code Annotated. 
Appellant was aware of the status of decedent's residence in 
Nevada shortly before his death even though it may not have 
been aware of the actual address of his residence in the State 
of Utah prior to his death. Decedent made no representations 
regarding the state of his domicile or other states in which 
he may of had assets. Further, there is no evidence of con-
cealment of assets or of the other administrations of the 
estate by the Personal Representative. The Hospital with due 
diligence could have discoverd the other administrations and 
properly filed its claim. 
5. The special administrator of the Nevada adminis-
tration in his accounting and the Order Approving the Accounting 
both recite as a finding of fact that the Hospital's claim 
had been filed against the estate, but had not been paid. 
This finding of fact is not an "adjudication" of the creditor's 
claim as contemplated in Utah Code Annotated 75-4-401. 
Therefore, there is no adjudication of the creditor's claim 
in Nevada which would be binding on the Utah Personal Represen-
tative • 
6. There are no particular facts or other hardships 
in this case which would warrant the creation of an exception 
to the nonclaim statute. The judicial creation of exceptions 
to statutory schemes should be reserved for extraordinary 
cases where the need for relief from severe hardship is 
compelling. This is not an appropriate case for the creation 
of a judicial exception. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7. The statutory scheme of the Uniform Probate 
Code contemplates the continued operation of various statutes 
of limitations including Utah Code Annotated 78-12-38. 
However, the Uniform Probate Code provides that the first 
limitation provision to accomplish a bar on the particular 
facts of each case will control. In this case §75-3-803(a) 
accomplished a bar prior to §78-12-38 and therefore controls. 
A 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT SHOULD DEFER TO THE FINDINGS 
OF FACT ENTERED BY THE TRIAL COURT WITHOUT 
SPECIAL INFERENCES IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER. 
On June 14, 1984 approximately one and one-half 
years after the first publication of Notice to Creditors, 
Appellant filed its "Petition for Allowance of Claim and Order 
Allowing Claim". (R 17). The Personal Representative of the 
Estate responded by filing her "Objection to Order Allowing 
Claims" (R 23) and moved to dismiss the Petition. (R 29-32). 
The Parties each submitted memoranda which included statements 
of fact and argument. (R 30-32; 35-42; 98-107). 
On September 10, 1984 the District Court called up 
the Petition for Allowance of Claim and the motion to deny 
the same. Each party was represented by counsel and each 
was heard. The parties stipulated that there were no issues 
of fact and further stipulated that the court should rule on 
the basis the stipulated facts which are found in the Trial 
Court's findings of fact (R 110-112) to which there has been 
no objection. (R 108). The Court thereafter ruled denying 
the Petition for Allowance of Claim. (UCA 75-3-806 [2] ). 
On appeal, Appellant now argues that this Court 
"must view the facts in the light most favorable to the 
Appellant". (Appellant's Brief [hereinafter AB] at 7.) The 
Personal Representative believes that based on the parties' 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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stipulation below this is an inappropriate standard of review. 
Indeed, Respondent urges that the District Court's rulings 
based on facts commonly stipulated by both parties are entitled 
to the same deference as if they had been entered after trial. 
There can be no question that where a trial court 
has dismissed a cause of action by entering a verdict or 
judgment of nonsuit or no cause of action, or where a case 
has been dismissed at the close of the Plaintiff's evidence 
or on a motion for directed verdict, this Court will review 
the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff's 
contentions. Anderson v., Parson Red E-Mix Paving Company, 
467 P.2d 45, 24 Utah 2d 128 (1970); Reliable Furniture Company 
v. American Home Insurance Company, 466 P.2d 368, 24 Utah 2d 
93 (1970); Newton v. State Road Commission, 462 P.2d 565, 23 
Utah 2d 350 (1970); Wilkinson v. Stevens, 403 P.2d 31, 16 
Utah 2d 424 (1965). Appellant's Petition for Allowance of 
Claim in the instant case, however, was not denied under any 
of those circumstances which would warrant an appellate review 
of the evidence in a light most favorable to Appellant. Simply 
stated, the policy that evidence should be viewed in a light 
most favorable to Appellant is applicable only in cases where 
the facts are disputed and the trier of fact has not had full 
opportunity to hear and weigh all of the facts and evidence. 
Such a rule is applied only where the evidentiary or fact 
finding process has been abbreviated. In the instant case the 
parties stipulated to the facts. No additional evidence or 
testimony was contemplated or tactically proffered* (See AB at 7) 
in 
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Indeed, the parties1 stipulation regarding the facts substituted 
for the evidentiary portion of the hearing, and authorized 
the trial court to rule and draw legitimate inferences there-
from without being required to view the evidence in a light 
favorable to either party. (See Generally 73 Am Jur 2d 
"Stipulations11 § 18). The Trial Court subsequently denied 
Appellant's Petition. The fact that the trial court's order 
is labeled as a "dismissal", however, cannot substantively 
transform the Court's action into something akin to a Rule 
41 dismissal. 
Pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties the 
trial court entered findings of fact. (R 110-112). Appellant 
does not challenge these findings. The Personal Representative 
believes that since the Petition for Allowance of Claim was 
submitted to the Court on the stipulation of the parties, said 
stipulation amounts to the equivalent of a trial thereon, and 
this Court should defer to the District Court's position with 
regard to the facts, and no inference or preference should be 
granted to the Appellant's contentions. Provo City Corporation 
v. Nielson Scott Company Inc., 603 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979); Polk 
v. Koerner, 111 Ariz. 493, 533 P.2d 660 (1975). 
Appellant's brief now contains various new alle-
gations of fact not found in the Trial Court's findings. 
These allegations relate primarily to the decedent's residence 
or domicile, allegations of fraud, false statements, concealment, 
the Appellant's lack of knowledge of the Utah proceedings and 
its alleged reliance on various of the decedent's representations. 
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(AB at 5, 15, 18, 19.) Respondent respectfully submits that • * 
as these allegations are not found in the Trial Court's 
Findings and did not form part of the stipulated case as 
submitted to the trial court by Appellant, that they should 
not be considered now by this Court. Indeed this Court should 
judicially limit its review to those facts contained in the 
Trial Court's Findings as submitted to that court by earlier 
stipulation,, (R 110-112.) Because Appellant's brief contains 
various allegations beyond the Trial Court's Findings of Fact, 
however, Respondent's brief will reply to the Appellant's 
allegations by reference to additional citations in the record 
also not found in the findings. 
POINT II 
THE HOSPITAL'S CLAIM FILED IN NEVADA 
PRIOR TO THE APPOINTMENT OF A PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE IS INVALID PURSUANT TO 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 75-3-104. 
Vickie Carroll filed her nomination of Mr. Jared 
Shafer to act as "Special Administrator" with limited authority 
to collect and maintain the assets of the estate. (R 48-55.) 
This special administrator, similar to the law in Utah, was 
given no power to act on creditor's claims or to initiate 
publication to notice of creditors but rather was limited to the 
specific powers granted him by order of the Nevada Court. (See, 
e.g. , UCA 75-3-617.) The claim of Southern Nevada Memorial 
Hospital was filed in Nevada on January 6, 1983. (R 111.) 
1 O 
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The petition to appoint an administrator in Nevada 
was filed January 10, 1983. (R 46.) Prior to entry of an 
order appointing a general administrator in Nevada, an adminis-
tration of the estate was opened in the state of Montana on 
January 18, 1983. (R 111; cf. R 67-68.) Mrs. Vonda Jean 
Biesen appeared in both forums challenging the appointment of 
administrators and claiming to be a surviving spouse. Vickie 
Carroll was never appointed personal representative in the 
State of Nevada. She was appointed personal representative 
in the administration of the estate in the State of Utah, 
however, on the 26th day of January, 1983. (R 111.) No 
general administrator with power to act on creditors claims 
was appointed in the State of Nevada until February 18, 1983, 
some 12 days after first publication of notice to creditors 
by the Utah Personal Representative. (R 67.) In short no 
personal representative or other person authorized to act 
on creditors claims had been appointed in any state at the 
time that Appellant filed it claim in the State of Nevada. 
Utah Code Annotated 75-3-104 states: 
"No proceeding to enforce a claim against the 
estate of a decedent or his successors may be 
revived or commenced before the appointment of 
a personal representative. After the appoint-
ment and until distribution, all proceedings 
and actions to enforce a claim against the 
estate are governed by the procedure prescribed 
by this Chapter 3. After distribution a 
Creditor whose claim has not been barred may 
recover from the distributees as provided in 
Section 25-3-1004 or from a former personal 
representative individually liable as provided 
in section 75-3-1005. This Section has no 
application to a proceeding by a secured 
creditor of the decedent to enforce his right 
i ^ 
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to his security except as to any deficiency 
judgment which might be sought therein." 
(Emphasis added). 
The Editorial Board Comment to § 75-3-104 states 
as follows: 
"This and sections of part 8 of chapter 
3, are designed to force creditors of 
decedents to assert their claims against 
duly appointed personal representatives. 
Creditors of the decedent are interested 
persons who may seek the appointment of 
a personal representative (Section 75-3-301). 
If no appointment is granted to another with-
in 45 days after the decedent's death,the 
Creditor may be eligible to be appointed 
if other persons with priority decline to 
serve or are ineligible (Secton 75-3-203). 
But, if a personal representative has been 
appointed and has closed the estate under 
circumstances which leave a creditor's claim 
unbarred, the creditor is premitted to enforce 
his claims against distributees as well as 
against the personal representative if any 
duty owed to creditors under Section 75-3-807 
or 75-3-1003 has been breached. The methods 
for closing estates are outlined in Section 
75-3-1001 - 75-3-1003. Termination of appoint-
ment are Sections 75-3-608 et. seg. may occur 
though the estate is not closed and so may 
be irrelevent to the question to whether 
creditors may pursue distributees." 
It is clear that the intent and policy of the framers 
of the Utah Probate Code is to compel creditors to assert 
claims against duly appointed personal representatives. In 
order to protect creditors from undue delay in the appointment 
of a personal representative, creditors are given the option, 
forty-five days after the death of the decedent to seek appoint-
ment themselves if others have declined to serve. § 75-3-201 
U.C.A. In the instant case Appellant did not seek to enforce 
its claim against the duly appointed representative but rather 
it sought to enforce its claim against the special administrator 
14 
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who had no power to deal with the claim. The Editorial Board 
Comments to § 75-3-104 state that Chapter 3 of the code, 
including part 8 on creditors claims, is applicable only after 
the appointment of a personal representative. Thus a creditor 
may not properly present a claim pursuant to Section 75-3-804 
until the personal representative has been appointed. 
In Price v. Sommermeyer, 577 P.2d 752 (Colo. 1978), 
the Colorado Supreme Court similarly held that pursuant to 
§15-12-104 of the Colorado Revised Statutes a claim was not 
valid unless a personal representative had been previously 
appointed. The Colorado Code Section interpreted in Price 
is identical to Utah Code Annotated §75-3-104. 
Since in the instant case no personal representative 
had been appointed when Appellant filed its claim, the claim 
cannot be said to have been properly presented pursuant to the 
provisions of Chapter 3 of the Utah Probate Code. As such it 
is not binding upon the personal representative of the estate. 
POINT III 
THE CLAIM OF SOUTHERN NEVADA HOSPITAL IS INVALID 
HAVING BEEN PREMATURELY FILED PRIOR TO PUBLICATION 
OF NOTICE TO CREDITORS. 
No notice to creditors was published in the adminis-
tration of the Estate in Nevada as contemplated by UCA 
§75-3-803. (R 111.) Notice to Creditors was first published 
in Utah on January 30, and February 6, 1983. (R 9, 111.) 
n c: 
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An Editorial Board Comment to UCA 75-3-815 which 
also explains the provisions of UCA 75-3-803 states: 
Under 75-3-803(1)(a), if a local (pro-
perty only) administration is commenced and 
proceeds to advertisment for claims before 
nonclaim statutes have run at domicile, 
claimants may prove claims in the local 
administration at any time before the local 
nonclaim expires. This section has the 
effect of subjecting all assets of the 
decedent, wherever they may be located 
and administered, to claims properly pre-
sented in any local administration. It is 
necessary, however, that the personal repre-
sentative of any portion of the estate be 
aware of other administrations in orsier for 
him to become responsible for claims and 
charges established against other adminis-
trations." (Emphasis added) 
From the above it is clear that the personal 
representative of an estate in the domicile cannot be 
bound merely by the filing of the claim in another state. 
Thus, unless the claim is properly established after Adver-
tisment for claims or publication of notice in the second 
forum prior to expiration of the nonclaim period in the 
domicile, it has no validity in the domicile. And, since 
there had been no publication in the State of Nevada or any 
state when Appellant filed its claim in Nevada, said claim 
could not constitute an established claim. 
In its brief Appellant cites three cases which appear 
to support the proposition that a creditor's claim may be filed 
prior to the publication of notice to creditors. A careful 
review of these cases, however, raises substantial questions 
about the validity of this proposition. Appellant's mainly 
posits its theory relying on Re Estate of Tanner, 288 So. 2d 
1 A 
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587, 70 A.L.R. 3d 778 (Fla. App. 1974). In Tanner, a curator 
had published notice to creditors absent court authorization. 
A certain creditor responded by filing a claim. Thereafter, 
and within the time provided by Florida Statute, the estate 
filed an objection to the claim. The creditor, however, failed 
to timely file suit after the rejection of its claim by the 
estate and the trial court held that the statute of limitations 
barred the action. On these facts the trial court certified, 
inter alia, the following question on appeal. 
"4. [where] a curator, appointed on February 
18, 1971, and to whom letters of Curatorship 
were issued on February 26, 1971, published 
notice to creditors without order of court 
authorizing him to do so, the first publi-
cation of which notice was made on March 
6, 1971, and claimant filed claim on August 
29, 1971, and heirs at law of decedent and 
their Attorney filed objection to such claim 
on October 12, 1981, and duly served such 
objection on the claimant, is claimant bar-
red, by failure to file suit, to establish 
claim within the time limited by FS Section 
33.18, FSA?" (70 A.L.R. 3d 780.) 
In attempting to formulate an analytical framework 
to answer this question, the Appellate Court asked the following 
question: "Could a claim have been filed and could a valid 
objection to the claim have been filed by the heirs even though 
no legal notice to creditors had been published?1' (IdL at 783.) 
The question posited and its answer were clearly dicta and 
clearly unnecessary to resolve the dispute. Also, in Tanner, 
notice had been published by the curator prior to filing of 
the creditors claim, however, this notice had been erroneously 
published without an appropriate court order as required by 
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Florida Law. Further distinguishing the Tanner case, that 
Court emphasized the differences under Florida Law between 
the authority of a curator and a personal representative. 
The authority of curators and personal representative was 
found not to be the same, therefore, the pronouncements of the 
Tanner case governing Florida curators are not persuasive in 
this case dealing with a personal representative and are dicta. 
Appellant than cites the old cases of Davis v. Davis1 
Estate, 56 Mont. 500, 185 P. 559 (1919), and Lowry v. Crandall, 
52 Ariz. 501, 83 P.2d 1003 (1938). Both Davis and Lowry were 
decided prior to the adoption of the Uniform Probate Code. In 
Davis, the Montana Supreme Court decided a case in which the 
general statute of limitations had run prior to the expiration 
of three months from publication of Notice to Creditors. The 
Creditor's claim in that case was filed after publication to 
creditors. The appellant argued that the general statute of 
limitations should be extended three months from publication 
to creditors on the theory that he could not file a claim 
until after the publication of Notice to Creditors. The Davis 
court held that a statute of limitations having commenced to 
run against a claim during the lifetime of the maker is 
interrupted only from the date of death to the appointment 
of an administrator. The court rejected the appellant's 
theory that he could not file a claim prior to publication. 
However, this view is once again dicta because the Court's 
holding rested on another basis. Furthermore, in Davis, 
publication of notice to creditors was completed prior to the 
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filing of the creditor's claim. Thus Davis is both unique and 
inapposite to the instant case. 
Lowry v. Crandall, supra, is more closely on point 
wherein an Arizona court held that it was proper to file a claim 
before publication of notice to creditors. Decided under pre 
code law, patterned after an earlier California statute, it 
is likely that the drafters of the Uniform Probate Code were 
aware of both the Lowry decision and the California statute. 
Thus, their inclusion of the words "and proceeds to adver-
tisement" in their comments to Sections 803 and 815 were most 
likely intended to settle the issue raised by such cases as 
the Lowry case and to reject the rules stated therein. The 
Personal Representative is unaware of any authority which has 
squarely decided this issue since the enactment of the Uniform 
Probate Code in the various states. 
The Personal Representative believes that this 
court should hold that Appellant's claim was prematurely 
filed and is void since no notice to creditors had been 
published. This holding rests upon sound policy reasons. 
As previously noted herein the Uniform Probate Code is designed 
to force creditors of decedents to assert their claims 
against duly appointed personal representatives. The Code 
is structured to allow creditors to seek the appointment of a 
personal representative, replace a personal representative 
who is dilatory in his duties and to force the estate to 
publish notice to creditors and otherwise administer the 
estate to the benefit of all creditors. The Personal 
T a 
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Representative believes that it is good policy to require 
creditors who are anxious to file their claims, to apply 
appropriate pressure on the estate to publish notice to 
creditors. This will have a salutory effect on Estate 
administration to the benefit of other creditors who may not 
be aware of the death or administration. Indeed if some 
creditors aware of decedent's death are allowed to file their 
claims prior to publication, then appropriate pressure may 
not be brought upon the personal representative to perform 
its statutory duty to publish Notice to Creditors. Thus, 
requiring all creditors to file their claims after publication 
of Notice to Creditors and at the same time giving said 
creditors a tool to be able to force said publication is 
sound public policy which protects and treats all creditors 
of the estate equally, not just those who may be aware of the 
death. 
POINT IV 
THERE WAS NO ADJUDICATION IN THE NEVADA 
ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE WHICH WOULD 
INVOKE THE OPERATION OF UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 75-4-401. 
Utah Code Annotated 75-4-401 states as follows : 
An adjudication rendered in any juris-
diction in favor of or against any personal 
representative of the estate is as binding on 
the local personal representative as if he 
were a party to the adjudication. 
The word "adjudication" is not defined in the 
statutory scheme. Its definition, however, is probative in 
determining whether there was an adjudication in the Nevada 
20 
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Administration binding on the Utah Personal Representative 
with regard to Appellant's claim- The Utah Supreme Court 
in Nielsen v. Utah National Bank, 120 P. 211, 40 Utah 95 
(1911), stated that the word "adjudication" means "a solemn 
or deliberate determination by judicial power of the rights 
of parties and so implies notice and a hearing". (120 P at 
214.) An adjudication also implies that the claims or the 
parties have been fully considered and put at rest by the 
entry of a judgment. People Ex. Rel. Argus Company v. Hugo, 
168 N.Y.S. 25, 27, 101 Misc. Rep. 481 (1917); Miller v. Scobie, 
11 So. 2d. 892, 894, 152 Fla. 328 (1943). 
Other Courts have held similarly that the allowance 
of a claim in a probate is an adjudication. In Tiernan*s 
Estate, 4, N.W. 2d 869, 871, 232 Iowa 139 (1942); Soppe v.Soppe, 
8 N.W. 2d 243, 245, 232 Iowa 1293 (1943). Ordinarily, however, 
mere findings in an order upon which a court bases no decision 
of the issues and which are not confirmed by the judgment do 
not constitute an adjudication. See Fairchilds v. Ninnescah 
Oil &' Gas Co., 99 P.2d 839, 843, 151 Kan. 551 (1940); Bird 
v. General Discount Corp., 21 S.E. 2d 651, 653, 194 Ga. 283 
(1942); Spalding v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. 117 A. 376, 
378, 96 Vt. 67 (1922). The order "settling the Final Account 
of Special Administrator" entered in the Eighth Judicial 
District Court for Clark County, Nevada, on May 11, 1984, 
recites as a finding of fact that: 
one creditor's claim was filed against the 
estate by Southern Nevada Memorial Hospital, 
in the amount of $24,832.54. Said creditors 
claim remains unpaid at the date of the filing 
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of said accounting since there are no assets 
in the estate to pay said hospital- (R 87.) 
The Order of the Court which follows this finding 
of fact approves the accounting of the special administrator 
and discharges the administrator. (R 88.) There is no indi-
cation in the order that the court had adjudicated the 
allowance or disallowance of the creditor's claim. This of 
course would have been improper since the special administrator 
had not been granted any authority to allow or disallow 
creditor's claims. The Court in Grigg v. Hanna, 278 N.W. 125, 
130, 283 Mich. 443 (1938) held that findings of fact found in 
an Order approving the accounting of an administrator did not 
constitute an adjudication of the substance of the finding. 
Simply stated, the issue of allowance of the claim was not 
before the Nevada Court. As further evidence of this fact, 
it should be noted that when Appellant finally filed its claim 
with the Personal Representative, the Personal Representative 
vehemently opposed allowance of the claim and filed a counter-
claim against Appellant alleging damages arising from Appel-
lant's negligent entrustment of the decedent's personal property 
to one Vonda Beisen. (R 19-22). Had the Personal Representative 
been aware that a claim of said hospital was being adjudicated 
in Nevada, said counterclaim would have been immediately 
instituted there• While the Personal Representative admits 
that the Order Settling Final Account of Special Administrator 
in Nevada is an adjudication, the only issues adjudicated 
therein are the acceptance of an acounting and the discharge 
of a special administrator- The mere recitation therein of 
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the undisputed fact that a claim had been filed and was unpaid 
is not an adjudication on the issue of the allowance or dis-
allowance of said claim. 
POINT V 
THE APPELLANT'S CLAIM IS BARRED BY THE NONCLAIM 
PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 75-3-803 TO WHICH 
THIS COURT SHOULD RECOGNIZE NO EXCEPTIONS. 
Utah Code Annotated 75-3-803 states: 
(1) all claims against the Decedentfs 
Estate which arose before the death of the 
decedent, including claims of the state and 
any subdivision of it, whether due or to become 
due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or un-
liquidated, founded on contract, tort, or 
other legal basis, if not barred earlier by 
other statute of limitations, are barred 
against the estate, the personal represen-
tative, and the heirs and devisees of the 
decedent, unless presented as follows: 
(a) Within three months after the 
date of first publication of Notice to 
Creditors, if notice is given in compliance 
with Section 75-3-801; provided, claims 
barred by the nonclaim statute at the 
decedents domicile before the first publi-
cation of claims in this state are also 
barred in this State. 
The parties stipulated and the trial court found, 
that notice to creditors was properly published on the 30th 
day of January, and the 6th and 13th days of February, 1983. 
(R 111). Thereafter, Appellant filed its claim with the 
Washington County Clerk on the 14th day of November, 1983. 
(R 111). On these facts the district court concluded that 
Appellant's claim was not timely filed and thus barred by 
operation of Utah Code Annotated 75-3-803(a). (R 112). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellant now asks this Court to carve out an 
exception to the strict application of the nonclaim provision 
under the particular facts of this case. (AB at 15.) Initially 
Respondent vehemently objects to Appellant's characterization 
of the facts recited in its brief allegedly justifying the 
proposed departure from the statutory scheme. Neither the 
Findings of Fact entered by the Trial Court, nor the record 
on appeal will support the Appellant's gratuitous allegations 
that the decedent and the Personal Representative are guilty 
of "fraud", "concealment", or "making false statements". 
(AB at 15-16.) For example, Appellant alleges that the 
decedent made "false statements" with regard to his residence 
and domicile. This supposed false statement was allegedly 
relied upon by Appellant preventing it from learning of the 
decedent's true residence and domicile. The Trial Court found 
that the decedent listed his address with Appellant as 4001 
East Sahara Avenue, the address of Maycliff Mini Storage and 
RV Park, where property was stored by Kenneth Carl Larsen* (R 
110.) The Trial Court made no finding and heard no evidence 
proffered by Appellant that the decedent's listing of this 
address was incorrect or intended to defraud or deceive 
Appellant or was anything other than a misunderstanding or 
mistake on the part of the decedent. Further the Trial Court 
made no findings and heard no evidence that Appellant relied 
on this information to its detriment or was prevented thereby 
from learning of the location of domicile or assets. 
24 
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Furthermore, a close examination of the Record On 
Appeal reveals error in Appellant's assertion that this mistaken 
or "false statement" by the decedent prejudiced the Hospital in 
some way. On the 18th day of January, 1983, an administration 
of the estate was opened in the State of Montana by filing a 
Petition of Intestacy, determination of heirs and appointment 
of personal representative. (Finding No. 7, R 111.) The 
Personal Representative appeared in the Montana matter 
alleging decedent's domicile to be in Utah. 
On January 27, 1983, Vonda Jean Biesen filed her 
Motion to Dismiss Petition for Appointment of Administrator 
with the Nevada Court. In her attached points and authorities 
Mrs. Biesen attached a Montana Driver's License and other 
documentation in support of her position that the decedent 
was a domiciliary of the State of Montana. (R 56-59.) Vonda 
Biesen, thereafter, filed an Affidavit in the Nevada District 
Court in which she alleged that the decedent's primary 
residence was Butte, Montana, but admitted that "at the time 
of his death we were spending some time in Las Vegas". (R 
71.) If Biesen's allegations can be taken at face value the 
Decedent had been spending time in Nevada just prior to his 
death. Thus, without more it is too harsh a judgment to allege 
fraud or false statement based on the simple listing of an 
address on an admission form. The Decedent was not a lawyer 
and could not be expected to know that Appellant was inquiring 
about his legal residence or domicile if indeed this is the 
intent of the inquiry. 
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The allegation that the decedent intentionally 
gave a false address, even if true, could not of itself 
prejudice Appellant. Appellant apparently assumes that since 
Nevada was the place of decedent's residence Nevada was also 
the State of domicile and the only state in which a probate 
would be opened. The allegation that the decedent incorrectly 
identified his address in Las Vegas cannot reasonably be 
twisted, however, into an affirmative representation that 
Nevada was the State of domicile or the only proper place of 
the probate of the estate. Appellant has access through the 
filings with the Nevada Court to information regarding the 
name and address of the personal representative, and facts 
regarding the Montana probate and indirectly the Utah adminis-
tration. Appellant simply incorrectly assumed that Nevada was 
the only place of administration and on appeal now desires to 
place the consequence of that assumption on the estate. 
Appellant entices this Court in its brief to fashion 
a new equitable exception to the strict operation of the non-
claim statute on the alleged facts cited in its brief. The 
Personal Representative believes that creating such an 
exception would have a disastrous effect on the integrity 
of the Uniform Probate Code and is unsound as a matter of 
public policy. The policy reasons for establishing statutes 
of limitations and specifically the relatively short nonclaim 
provisions of the Probate Code are well known and need not be 
documented herein. (See e.g., 51 Am Jur 2d "Limitation of 
Actions" §17.) The creation of an equitable exception to the 
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operation of the nonclaim statute sends a signal to every 
claimant whose claim had been barred, that it should bring 
an action to establish an equitable exception. This could 
have the effect of opening the floodgates of litigation within 
estate administrations and thus delay and prolong the adminis-
tration and closing of estates all to the prejudice and detriment 
of both heirs and creditors. The Personal Representative also 
believes that, except in extreme cases, the creation of an 
exception to the operation of the nonclaim statute should be 
primarily as legistative prerogative. 
Appellant cites Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 
(Utah 1981), in support of its proposition that the unique 
facts of this case justify an exception to the nonclaim 
statute- In Myers, appellants posited two arguments why 
their cause of action should not be barred by a two year 
statute of limitations. They argued (1) that the cause of 
action should not accrue until the Plaintiffs discovered the 
death - the so called "Discovery Rule" or (2) that the 
Defendant should be precluded from relying on the statute 
because [Defendant] erroneously reported the decedent's name 
which misled the Plaintiffs and prevented them from instituting 
their action in a timely fashion. 
The facts in the instant case would not support 
the creation of an equitable exception on either basis 
stated in the Myers case. In the instant case, Appellant 
cannot argue the application of the "Discovery Rule". Clearly 
the Hospital knew that it had a claim against the decedent's 
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estate and in fact had filed a claim in Nevada on the sixth 
day of January, 1983- Appellant further cannot successfully 
argue that it was misled or prevented by the decedent or the 
Personal Representative from filing a claim or otherwise 
protecting its interest. As previously explained herein, the 
statement of the decedent identifying an address in Las Vegas 
as his address caused Appellant to file its claim in the state 
of Nevada which was not prejudicial to Appellant. By reviewing 
the Nevada Court file, Appellant could have discovered other 
administrations. Appellant's new argument that the Personal 
Representative concealed the administration of the estate in 
Utah is simply without merit. No findings by the trial court 
or any facts were proffered by Appellant in support of this 
claim. While it is true that as Personal Representative of 
the estate in Utah, Vickie Carroll did not notify Appellant of 
Publication in Utah, there is no evidence that the personal 
representative had actual knowledge of Appellant's claim and 
there is no affirmative duty on a personal representative to 
notify claimants in ancillary administrations. Consequently, 
Respondent urges that there are no unique and compelling facts 
found in the record of this case that would justify circum-
vention of the nonclaim provisions of the Uniform Probate Code 
by establishment of an exception. 
28 
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POINT VI 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 75-1-106 HAS NO APPLICATION 
IN THE INSTANT CASE. 
Utah Code Annotated 75-1-106 states: 
Wherever a fraud has been perpetrated 
in connection with any proceeding or any 
statement filed under this code or if fraud 
is used to avoid or circumvent the provisions 
or purposes of this code, any person injured 
thereby, may obtain appropriate relief against 
the perpetrator of the fraud or restitution from 
any person (other then a bona fide purchaser) 
benefiting from the fraud, whether innocent 
or not. Any proceeding must commence with-
in three years after the discovery of the 
fraud, but no proceeding may be brought 
against one, not a perpetrator of the fraud 
later then five years after the commission 
of the fraud. This section has no bearing 
on remedies relating to fraud practiced on 
a decedent during his lifetime which effects 
the succession of his estate. 
Appellant urges that it should be given relief from 
the three month limitation of Section 75-3-803 and should be 
allowed three years to bring its claim pursuant to UCA 
75-1-106, because of the supposed fraud of the decedent in 
giving misinformation regarding his residence. Initially, 
it should be reasserted that the allegations of fraud are 
naked allegations unsupported by the findings of the Trial 
Court or the Record on Appeal. However, even assuming 
arguendo the truth of the allegations raised in Appellant's 
brief, the Personal Representative believes that UCA 75-1-106 
has no application in this case. The language of UCA 75-1-106 
limits its application to frauds perpetrated "in connection 
with any proceeding or in any statement filed under this code, 
O Q 
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or if used to avoid or circumvent the provisions or purposes 
of this code". The supposed fraud in the instant case was 
the decedent's failure to provide the Petitioner with the 
proper residential address on an admission form. Clearly 
this alleged pre-death failure on the part of the decedent 
was not perpetrated "in connection with any probate proceedings" 
or in connection with "filing any statement" in his own 
probate proceeding. Thus, Appellant must prove that Decedent 
intended to "avoid or circumvent the provisions or purposes 
of the code". Appellant has cited no finding or other 
evidence which would substantiate the claim that the decedent 
listed his address as 4001 East Sahara Avenue with the 
intent of circumventing the provisions or purposes of the 
Uniform Probate Code, nor is there any evidence that in fact 
the decedent's stated address had this effect. As stated 
previously on February 11, 1983, Vonda Biesen made a Motion 
to Dismiss the Petition of Mr. Shaffer for appointment as 
administrator in Nevada. (R 56.) In her Motion and Supporting 
Affidavit Mrs. Biesen alleged that the Decedent was a resident 
of the State of Montana. Mrs. Biesen produced as Exhibits 
to her motion, a Montana Driver's License, and several 
Montana Vehicle Registrations. Thus, Appellant was put on 
notice that the decedent may not be a Nevada domiciliary. 
Additionally, had Appellant simply inquired, a probate had 
been already initiated in the State of Montana. (Finding 
No. 7, R 111.) In that Administration Vickie Carroll the 
personal representative in the Utah Administration had 
^n 
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alleged both that the decedent had assets in and was a 
domiciliary of the State of Utah and not Montana or Nevada. 
Thus, Appellant, with due diligence could have and should 
have discovered the facts regarding the decedent's domicile 
and the location of his assets. Clearly if the Personal 
Representative had been attempting to conceal assets the 
list of assets found in the Nevada Court file and the allega-
tions in the Montana Administration would not have been 
made. Simply stated there is no evidence of fraud in the 
probate, and the Personal Representative's actions bely any 
such assertions, belated or otherwise. 
POINT VII 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 78-12-38 HAS NO APPLICATION 
IN THE INSTANT CASE 
Utah Code Annotated 78-12-38 states: 
If a person against whom a cause of 
action exists, dies without the state, the 
time which elapses between his death and the 
expiration of one year after the issuing, 
within this state, of letters testamentary 
or letters of administration in not a part 
of the time limited for the commencement of 
an action, therefore, against his executor 
or administrator* 
The purpose of UCA 78-12-38 is to extend the time 
for commencement of actions imposed by other general statutes 
of limitations under stated circumstances. It operates in 
conjunction with regular statutes of limitation to alter 
their effect. 
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Appellant argues that UCA 78-12-38 should extend 
the time for filing its claim in the instant case, to the 
exclusion of the operation of UCA 75-3-803. Appellantfs 
agrument is invalid. The Uniform Probate Code, enacted in 
1975 many years after the adoption of UCA 78-12-38 in 1951, 
recognizes the continued existence and operation of a multi-
plicity of statutes of limitation. The Uniform Probate Code 
provides the groundrules for determining which of many poten-
tially conflicting statutes of limitations will control. UCA 
75-3-802 states: 
The running of any statute of limitations 
measured from some other event than the death 
and advertisment for claims against the 
decedent is suspended during the three months 
following the decedent's death but resumes 
thereafter as to claims not barred pursuant 
to the Sections which follow. For purposes 
of any statute of limitations, the proper 
presentation of a claim under Section 
75-3-804 is equivalent to commencement of 
a proceeding on the claim. 
Thus, every regular statute of limitation is extended or 
suspended for three months following the decedent's death 
but resumes its operation and may bar a claim after the 
three month suspension. 
An Editorial Board Comment to UCA 75-3-802 states: 
It should be noted that under UCA Section 
75-3-803 and Section 75-3-804, it is possible 
for a claim to be barred by the process of 
claim, disallowance, and failure by the 
creditor to commence a proceeding to enforce 
his claim prior to the end of the three 
month suspension period. Thus, the regular 
statute of limitations applicable during 
the debtor's lifetime, the nonclaim 
provisions of Section 75-3-803 and Section 
75-3-804, and the three year statute of 
limitation of Section 75-3-803 all have 
potential application to the claim. The 
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first of the three to accomplish a bar 
controls, (emphasis added) 
The clear intention of the framers of the Probate 
Code is that whichever of the applicable statutes of limitation 
first accomplishes a bar will control the other potentially 
applicable statutes of limiation to their exclusion. In 
this case UCA 75-3-803 accomplishes a bar before UCA 78-12-38, 
therefore, the three month nonclaim provision of Section 
75-3-803 controls. 
Appellant correctly states the rule of law that 
statutes should be construed together, harmonized and each 
given a sphere of operation if possible. (AB at 20.) Even 
though UCA 78-12-38 does not apply in the instant case because 
UCA 75-3-803(a) was first to accomplish a bar, this does not 
mean that UCA 78-12-38 has no sphere application or has been 
repealed by implication. Thus, there are some circumstances 
under which UCA 78-12-38 may still have a sphere of operation 
which may be harmonized with UCA 75-3-803. Suppose hypothetically, 
that a person against whom a cause of action existed died 
outside of the State of Utah, thus triggering the possible 
application of UCA 78-12-38 by its own terms. Hypothetically, 
the regular statute of limitations would bar action on the 
claim within five months after the decedent's death. Four 
months after the decedent's death letters of administration 
are issued, however, there is no publication of Notice to 
Creditors. In this hypothetical UCA 75-3-803(a) would have 
no application since no notice to creditors had been published. 
Additionally, Section 75-3-803(b) would not operate until 
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three years after the decedent's death. Section 78-12-38 
would operate to extend the bar provisions of the regular 
statute of limitations one year after the issuance of letters 
of administration. Since the regular statute of limitations 
as extended by UCA 78-12-38 is still the first to accomplish 
a bar, it would control. 
The adoption by this Court of the proposition posited 
by the Appellant to-wit, that Section 78-12-38 applies to the 
exclusion of §75-3-803 in cases where the decedent dies 
outside the state of Utah, would have the effect of repealing 
by implication portions of §75-3-803 which expressly apply 
to decedents who die out of state. UCA 75-3-803(a) states 
that claims in this state are barred within three months 
after the date of first publication of notice to creditors 
provided that "claims barred by the nonclaim statute at the 
decedent's domicile before the first publication for claims 
in this state are also barred in this state." The codifiers 
intended that claims could be barred in this state if a 
personal representative had been appointed in an alternative 
forum who had published notice to creditors and claims had 
been barred in the alternative forum by that state's nonclaim 
statute. This provision would be repealed by Appellant's 
proposition. 
Utah Code Annotated §75-3-803(b) provides that a 
claim is forever barred three years after the decedent's 
death, even if no notice to creditors had been published. 
Adoption of Appellant's proposition that §75-3-803 is sup-
planted by §78-12-38 could extend claims for a period in 
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excess of three years if letters testamentary or letters of 
administration were issued toward the end of the three year 
period even though no notice to creditors had been published 
within three years thus impliedly repeal UCA §75-3-803(b). 
Additionally, if §75-3-803 is inoperable in a case where a 
decedent dies out-of-state the limitation period could be 
extended indefinitely by the operation of §78-12-38, since 
neither the Uniform Probate Code nor UCA §78-12-38 affirma-
tively requires that letters of testamentary or letters of 
administration be issued in the State of Utah. 
Utah Code Annotated §75-1-105 provides that the 
Probate Code is a general act intended as a unified coverage 
of the subject and no part of it should be deemed impliedly 
repealed if this can be avoided- Since the provisions of UCA 
§78-12-38 can be harmonized with the provisions of UCA 
§75-3-803 on the basis that the operation of the first statute 
of limitations to accomplish a bar will operate to the ex-
clusion of other relevant statutes of limitation, there is 
no justification for the creation of a category or class of 
cases consisting of those cases in which a decedent dies 
outside of the State of Utah upon which the provisions of 
§75-3-803 does not operate and would be impliedly repealed. 
Appellant's argument is untenable and cannot be adopted by 
this Court without undermining and destoying the unity and 
purposes of the Uniform Probate Code-
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CONCLUSION 
The District Court's ruling that Appellant's Claim 
is barred by the operation of the nonclaim provisions of the 
Uniform Probate Code should be affirmed. In the instant case, 
Appellant filed a claim in an ancillary probate prior to the 
appointment of a personal representative which claim was never 
adjudicated in that forum, and thereafter failed to timely 
file its claim with the duly appointed personal representative 
in the local administration. Appellant's arguments run counter 
to strong public policy and misinterpret the harmonizing 
effect of the Uniform Probate Code on the various applicable 
statutes of limitation. 
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